FÜR LEHRAMTS-STUDIERENDE BIS ZUR ZWISCHENPRÜFUNG

Átírás

1 Attila Tanyi, Ph.D. (Zukunftskolleg/Department of Philosophy; Room Y217, tel. (ext.): 5658; Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Proseminar (undergraduate seminar), Konstanz, Summer semester 2011/12 Monday, , Room G305 FÜR BACHELOR-STUDIERENDE (For BA students) FÜR LEHRAMTS-STUDIERENDE BIS ZUR ZWISCHENPRÜFUNG (For Teacher Training students) FÜR EPG1-STUDIERENDE (For EPG1 students) 4 ECTS-Credits Introduction. Jeremy Bentham s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation is probably the funding work of the moral theory known as utilitarianism today. It is certainly the first systematic treatment of the theory and already as such it deserves special attention. But Bentham s work has more than historical relevance; its substantial statements and arguments are also relevant and interesting today. In the book Bentham famously puts forward the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number and makes important contributions to the theory of crime and punishment. In the course we will read Bentham s work and discuss its content. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use - this is one of the standard ones, available in bookshops and on the internet is Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dover, It is strongly recommended to purchase the book; there is nevertheless a copy in the so-called semester apparat (books on reserve for running university courses) of the course in the Library. The book costs ca. 10 EUR online (Amazon and AbeBooks). Further secondary material is also available in the same semester apparat. Background and overview reading. I am not aware of the existence of any lengthier encylopedia entry on Bentham s philosophy that would be freely available online. If anyone knows or finds such an entry, please let me know. A decently written and informative enough entry can, however, be found in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The semester apparat of the course contains several volumes on Bentham s philosophy, these can also be consulted as background. Course requirements. As a rule, the course will be completed by a page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course (length depending on whether the student completes a Hausarbeit or an Essay ). Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. However, it is also possible, with the course leader s permission, to take the course only for a pass without a grade, or to only audit the course. During the course, student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing the author s position and making critical remarks and commentaries (the latter are particularly welcome!).! 1!

2 Grading. The final grade will be composed of three parts: seminar participation and attendance (15%), seminar presentation (15%), final paper (70%). My grading policy for student papers is the following: for a grade between 1 and 2, the student must present an original idea in some (convincing) detail, in addition to giving a good and correct summary of Bentham s relevant discussion; for a grade between 2 and 3, the student must prove to have a competent grasp of Bentham s relevant arguments by giving a good summary, pointing out the weak points, perhaps making suggestions how to overcome such weaknesses; for a grade between 3 and 4, the student must show that he/she understands Bentham s text. Use of secondary material is permitted, but not required (this means: just because a paper shows that the student read a lot, will not guarantee a better grade ) Course schedule. We will read only the book, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation; no secondary material, or other work by Bentham, is included as a mandatory reading. This does not mean, however, that such material cannot be consulted for discussion in the seminars or for the papers written at the end of the course. As for the organization of the seminar, each session will begin with a student presentation (unless there are outstanding problems left over from the previous session), which will be followed by open discussion. Below follows a schedule of the seminars. (Note: Chapter numbers come first, then are page numbers listed, in brackets.) All references are to the following edition of Bentham s work: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dover Philosophical Classics, London: Dover Publishers, Seminar 2. Chapters I and II (1-23) Seminar 3. Chapters III, IV, and V (24-42) Seminar 4. Chapter VI (43-69) Seminar 5. Chapter VII, VIII, IX (70-96) Seminar 7. Chapter X (97-130) Seminar 8. Chapter XI ( ) Seminar 9. Chapter XII and XIII ( ) Seminar 10. Chapter XIV ( ) Seminar 11. Chapters XV ( ) Seminar 12. Chapter XVII ( ) (Note. There are altogether 14 occasions to meet in the semester (by my counting, correct me if I am wrong). However, one falls out due to national holiday (05.28), and another because it was this week s introductory seminar (04.16). This leaves us with 12 occasions to meet. The course schedule above is designed accordingly. I have left out Chapter XVI, which is a very long and technical chapter, interesting not so much for philosophers but for legal scholars (in my view). By popular demand, we can of course include (parts of) the chapter in the discussion. The rest of the schedule is also flexible: depending how discussion in the given seminar shapes up, we can discuss certain chapters more, and other chapters less, than as they appear in the schedule above.)!! 2!

3 Attila Tanyi Henry Sidgwick s The Methods of Ethics Hauptseminar, Konstanz, Winter semester 2010/11 Montag, 10-12am, Raum D435 Introduction. Henry Sidgwick was one of the most influential ethical philosophers of the Victorian era, and his work continues to exert a powerful influence on Anglo- American ethical and political theory. His masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics (Hackett, 7 th edition, 1907), was first published in 1874 and in many ways marked the culmination of the classical utilitarian tradition. Sidgwick's treatment of that position was more comprehensive and scholarly than any previous one, and he set the agenda for most of the twentieth-century debates between utilitarians and their critics. But in addition to authoritatively formulating utilitarianism and inspiring utilitarians, the Methods has also served as a general model for how to do ethical theory, since it provides a series of systematic, historically informed comparisons between utilitarianism and its leading alternatives. C. D. Broad, a later successor to Sidgwick's Cambridge chair, famously went so far as to say Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics seems to me to be on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written, and to be one of the English philosophical classics. For these reasons engaging with Sidgwick's work remains an excellent way to cultivate a serious philosophical interest in ethics, meta-ethics, and practical ethics, not to mention the history of these subjects. This course will systematically investigate Sidgwick s position, his arguments and method. The language of instruction will be English. Hausarbeit möglich. The course will be completed by a page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course. Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. During the course student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing Sidgwick s position and making critical remarks and commentaries. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use - this is the standard one, available in bookshops and the internet is Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 7 th edition, 1907 (reprinted in 1981). Background and overview reading. Those who are interested and want to have a good overview of Sidgwick philosophy before the course are advised to read the entry on Sidgwick in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (accessible for free on the internet). Other places where one can find good treatment of Sidgwick' philosophy that are in the semester apparatus of the course are the following: Bart Schultz, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ross Harrison (ed.), Henry Sidgwick, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.! 1!

4 Bart Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Jerome B. Schneewind, Sidgwick s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge, The last two works are particularly useful since they involve extensive discussion of The Methods of Ethics. Course schedule. What follows is the schedule of the course with topic and literature for each occasion. I do not here provide secondary literature; if a student is interested in the given topic wants to write his/her paper on it, for instance I am happy to provide further bibliographic information. Seminar 1 (October 18). Introduction and general matters of interest (practical issues: examination, grading, student presentations etc.). Lecture by the course instructor. Overview of the work, ethics and politics, ethical judgments. Book I, Chapters I-III Seminar 2 (October 25). Pleasure and desire, free will. Book I, Chapters IV-V November 1: national holiday, All Saints day. Seminar 3 (November 8). Overview of intuitionism and egoism. Goodness. Book I, Chapters VII-IX Seminar 4 (November 15). Egoism and empirical hedonism. The congruence of happiness and duty. Book II, Chapters I, II, V Seminar 5 (November 22). Intuitionism, virtue and duty. Book III, Chapters I, II Seminar 6 (November 29). Benevolence. Book III, Chapter IV Seminar 7 (December 6). Justice. Book III, Chapter V Seminar 8 (December 13). Laws and promises (political obligation, fairness).! 2!

5 Book III, Chapter VI Seminar 9 (December 20). Review of common-sense morality. Book III, Chapter XI Seminar 10 (January 10). Moral motivation, moral judgment, philosophical intuitionism. Book III, Chapters XII, XIII Seminar 11 (January 17). Ultimate good, the meaning and proof of utilitarianism. Book III, Chapter XIV Book IV, Chapters I, II Seminar 12 (January 24). Utilitarianism and common-sense morality. Book IV, Chapter III Seminar 13 (January 31). The method of utilitarianism. Book IV, Chapters IV, V Seminar 14 (February 7). The relations of the three methods, the dualism of practical reason. Concluding Chapter! 3!

6 Demokrácia elmélet Tanyi Attila A kurzus feladata a demokrácia mára elmosódott fogalmának tisztázása. Ennek megfelelően két elkülönülő, ugyanakkor egymást kiegészítő részre oszlik fel a tematika. Egyrészt tartalmazza a főbb filozófiai megközelítéseket, értve ez alatt a haszonelvű, a rousseau-i episztemikus, valamint a mára oly divatossá vált deliberativ, diskurzus alapú demokrácia modellek kritikai elemzését. Szintén kitér a közgadászok számára valószínűleg ismertebb és talán vonzóbb schumpeteri valamint downsi koncepcióra is, amely a demokráciát is a verseny és a piac fogalmaival próbálja leírni. A másik, reményem szerint a filozófiatörteneti megközelítést kiegészítő elméleti blokk inkább a politikatudomány területéhez tartozik és olyan támékat tárgyal mint a többségi elv és a demokrácia viszonya, preferencia aggregáció, szavazási procedúrák és kapcsolatos problémák. Végül de nem utolsósorban a kurzus kitér a demokrácia és az alkotmányosság (constitutionalism) viszonyára is. Mindezek során, ahogy az a tematikából is kiderül a kurzus épít az előző politikafilozófiai bevezető kurzusomra. Ugyanakkor az ott szerzett ismeretek nem feltétlenül szükségesek a tárgyalandó témák megértéséhez, bár kétségtelenül megkönnyítik azt. 1. téma Bevezetés: normatív kérdések Kötelező olvasmányok: - Brian Barry: Is Democracy Special?, in. Barry: Democracy and Power, Clarendon, Oxford, 1991, pp George Kateb: The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, in. Ethics, 91 (1981), pp téma Klasszikus demokrácia koncepciók I: A haszonelvű megközelítés Kötelező olvasmányok: - John Mill: Government, in. Mill: Political Writings, Cambridge UP, 1992, pp Richard Harrison: Bentham, in. Harrison: Democracy, Ch. III, Routledge, 1993, pp téma Klasszikus demokrácia koncepciók II: Rousseau elmélete Kötelező olvasmányok: - J.J. Rousseau: On the Social Contract, részletek, Indianapolis, Cambrdige, Hackett, 1987

7 - Richard Harrison: Rousseau, in. Democracy, Ch. IV, pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Joshua Cohen: Autonomy and Authority: Rousseau on Democracy, Manuscript 4. Klasszikus demokrácia koncepciók: Liberalizmus Kötelező olvasmányok: - Benjamin Constant: The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, in. Constant: Political Writings, Cambridge UP, 1988, pp Quentin Skinner: The Idea of Negative Liberty, in. R. Rorty J.B. Schneewind Q. Skinner (eds.): Philosophy in History, Cambridge UP, 1984, pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Carol Pateman: Rousseau, J.S. Mill and G.D.H. Cole, in. Pateman: Participation and Democratic Theory, Ch. IV, Cambridge UP, 1989, pp téma Demokrácia mint verseny Kötelező olvasmányok: - Anthony Downs: An Economic Theory of Democracy, Part I, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, pp Joseph A. Scumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Chs XXI, XXII, Routledge, London, 1992, pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - D. Robertson: A Predictive Theory of Comptetive Democracy, in. Robertson: A Theory of Party Competition, Chapter 2, J. Wiley and Sons, London, 1976, pp David Miller: The Competitive Model of Democracy, in. Duncan (ed.): Theory and Practice, Cambrdidge UP, 1983, pp téma Választói preferenciák Kötelező olvasmányok: - G. Brennan and L.E. Lomasky: Large Numbers, Small Costs, in. Brennan- Lomasky (eds.): Politics and Process, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp J. H. Aldrich: When Is It Rational to Vote?, in. D.C. Muller (ed.): Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge UP, 1997, pp téma A választói prefernciák információs háttere Kötelező olvasmányok: - A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins: The Democratic Dilemma, Cambridge UP, 1998, Chs 3-4, pp A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins: Representation or Abdication?, in. European Journal of Political Research, 37/3 May 2000, pp téma Preferencia aggregáció

8 Kötelező olvasmányok: - W. H. Riker: Liberalism Against Populism Chs I and X, Prospects Heights, Ill, Waveland Press, 1982, pp. 1-19, J. Coleman-J. Ferejohn: Democracy and Social Choice, in. Ethics 97 (1986), pp Joshua Cohen: An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, in. Ethics 97 (1986), pp téma Demokrácia mint vita Kötelező olvasmányok: - Joshua Cohen: Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in. A. Hamlin-P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp Amy Gutmann-Dennis Thompson: The Consitution of Deliberative Democracy, in. Democracy and Disagreement, Belknap, Cambridge, Mass., 1996 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Seyla Benhabib: Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, in. Constellations, 1/ Joshua Cohen: Democracy and Liberty, in. Jon Elster (ed.): Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge, téma Demokratikus egyenlőség és a többségi elv Kötelező olvasmányok: - D.W. Rae E. Schikler: Majority Rule, in. D.C. Mueller (ed.): Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge UP, 1997, pp Charles Beitz: The Subject of Political Equality, in. Princeton UP, 1989, Ch.2 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - K.O. May: A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions, in. Econometrica 20 (1952), pp téma Alkotmányosság és bírói felügyelet Kötelező olvasmányok: - R. Dworkin: Political Judges and the Rule of Law, in. Dworkin: A Matter of Principle, Harvard UP, 1985, pp Jeremy Waldron: Rights and Majorities, Rousseau Revisited, in. J. W. Chapman A. Wertheimer (eds.): Majorities and Minorities, New York UP, 1990, pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - D.C. Mueller: Consitituional Public Choice, in. Mueller (ed.): Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge UP, 1997, pp D. Gauthier: Consituting Democracy, D. Copp J. Hampton J.E. Roemer (eds.): The Idea of Democracy, Cambridge UP, 1993, pp

9 Identity and Morality Course file:///users/atany/documents/applications/apa/teaching/per... Staff at the Department of Philosophy In Swedish In English Mallsida för personalsidor - engelska IDENTITY AND MORALITY Praktisk filosofi, Kandidatkurs, Litteraturkurs II vt 2008; Attila Tanyi; D713 attila.tanyi@philosophy.su.se Office hours: Tue 14-16; Thu 16-18; by appointment This course will focus on personal identity and its role in ethical theory. We will discuss several theories of personal identity and examine their implications for our views about prudence, moral responsibility, bioethics, distributive justice, and special obligations. Persons seem to persist through some physical and psychological changes, but not others. What are the conditions of personal identity through time, and how are they related to a person s physical and psychological characteristics? What unites different stages of a single life, and what distinguishes stages in different lives? Some views about personal identity are reductionist, claiming that a person s persistence is a matter of familiar physical and/or psychological facts; others deny these reductionist claims. We will look at the classical debate between reductionists, such as John Locke ( ) and non-reductionists such Joseph Butler ( ) and Thomas Reid ( ) and then turn to contemporary discussions, especially the imaginative and resourceful defense of psychological reductionism by Derek Parfit. Parfit argues that psychological reductionism makes best sense of our responses to a diverse range of thought experiments involving brain transplants, physical and psychological scanning and modification, physical and psychological fission (and fusion), and teletransportation. He also believes that psychological reductionism has some surprising consequences. According to psychological reductionism, my survival can be indeterminate. For instance, I might know all the facts about the future, including the fact that someone will suffer tomorrow, yet, according to reductionism, I might still not know whether it will be me that suffers. Psychological reductionism also seems to imply that the difference between myself and others is a difference of degree, not kind. Is this plausible, or is the separateness of persons some deep fact? If the intrapersonal/interpersonal distinction is not a fundamental one, psychological reductionism may force us to change some common assumptions. Perhaps my relationship to my distant future self is more like my relationship to another person. If so, this may lead us to reconsider the rationality of prudence. Psychological reductionism may also lead us to see some interpersonal associations for instance, those involving love and friendship as held together by the same sort of glue that holds together a single life. How might this conclusion affect our view of self-love and friendship? Of there can be interpersonal, as well as intrapersonal psychological continuity, should this affect the way that we apportion responsibility for good and bad deeds? Perhaps parents should be held responsible, at least in part, for the crimes their children commit. What about distributive justice? It is sometimes thought the importance of distributional norms depends on the separateness of persons. Both John Rawls ( ) and Robert Nozick ( ) rest their influential criticisms of utilitarianism on the separateness of persons. How might our views about distributive justice change if we reject the separateness of persons? Finally, several areas in bioethics rely heavily on considerations of personal identity. The morality of advance directives, of embryonic stem cell research (and genetic issues in general), or of abortion are good examples. In all these cases psychological reductionism takes a leading and often revisionary role. FORMAT The course consists of seven three-hour seminars. Each seminar will be framed by a student presentation: in the course of a close reading of the text, the student will guide us through the text (see below), while other participants can join in with their questions and comments. The number of presentations per seminar may vary depending on the number of registered students. If there is more than one presentation scheduled for a seminar, I will schedule presentations in such a way that they correspond to the structure of the topic discussed. I will also try to introduce material and ask questions in a way that aims to impose useful analytical structure on the readings and issues. REQUIREMENTS Students registered for the course are required to give presentations and write one term paper. The outline of the presentation 1 of 6 11/24/08 9:39 PM

10 Identity and Morality Course file:///users/atany/documents/applications/apa/teaching/per... (2-3 pages) must be submitted to me 5PM of the day before the seminar takes place. Presentations should have an analytical structure, setting out the arguments employed in the text and making critical remarks, suggestions related to the arguments. Topics for the term paper will be distributed to participants before the last seminar of the course (March 31). Each student should choose one topic and write an argumentative essay of not more than 15 pages (12 point, Times New Roman, double spaced) and submit the paper to me not later than April 7, 12AM. Seminar participation, including presentation will be worth 50% of the final grade; the term paper will be worth 50% of the final grade. Participation in seminars is strictly obligatory, given the few number of occasions we will meet. COURSE MATERIAL The following books have been ordered for the course and should (soon) be available at the University Bookstore (Akademikbokhandeln): Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford UP Perry, ed. Personal Identity, Columbia UP The following encyclopedia entries provide a good introduction to and overview of the topic: Olson, Personal Identity, in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy D. Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy A useful course website that I borrowed a lot from: David Brink: Persons and Values WEBSITE The website contains all the necessary information: literature, topics, schedules, practical information on the course etc. Where it was possible, I also provided links to the articles and books: they are available from the University Library. The remaining literature (only the required, not the recommended) will be available for pickup in the Philosophy Department's administration office from the beginning of March (with the exception of the above two books: Perry and Parfit). The website will also contain the uploaded student presentations (the 2-3 page long outlines mentioned above) as soon as I receive them (that is, after 5pm of the day before the seminar). Participants are therefore strongly advised to check the website regularly. I. PERSONAL IDENTITY Session I. Locke and his critics. What is it for one person to persist through time, that is, for persons at different times to be one and the same? Why do we need a theory of personal identity? We expect persons to survive certain physical and psychological changes, but not others. Why is this? How are these physical and psychological features of persons related to their identity? We being our inquiry with Locke's memory theory and its criticism by Reid (transitivity charge) and Butler (circularity charge). Here we will also meet the main alternative theories, i.e. reductionism (physical and psychological) and non-reductionism. Required: Locke, Of Identity and Diversity in. Perry Reid, Of Identity and Of Mr. Locke s Account of Our Personal Identity in. Perry Butler, Of Personal Identity in. Perry Recommended: Hume, Our Idea of Identity, Of Personal Identity and Second Thoughts in. Perry Noonan, Personal Identity, Chapter 1 Session II. Psychological reductionism and its rivals I. We start with Bernard Williams' argument against psychological reductionism. Then we turn to Parfit's development of Locke's theory - psychological continuity vs. memory - as well as his defense of psychological reductionism against Williams' (and others') objections. What is quasi-memory and what is the combined spectra argument? And how do they support psychological reductionism? Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters Recommended: Williams, The Self and the Future in. Perry 2 of 6 11/24/08 9:39 PM

11 Identity and Morality Course file:///users/atany/documents/applications/apa/teaching/per... Noonan, Personal Identity, Chapters 2-11 S. Shoemaker, Persons and Their Pasts and Personal Identity Grice, Personal Identity in. Perry Rovane, The Bounds of Agency, Chapters 1-2 Session III. Psychological reductionism and its rivals II. Parfit claims that fission cases (cases when people divide) demonstrate that it is psychological continuity, rather than personal identity as such, that matters to us. Is he right? Are fission cases, as many claim, amount to an objection against psychological reductionism? We then turn to another argument, this time by fellow (physical) reductionists. Olson s thinking animal argument against psychological reductionism (and in favour of physical reductionism). Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters Recommended: Olson, What Are We?, Chapter 2 Nagel, Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness in. Perry Nagel, The View From Nowhere, Chapter 3 Lewis, Survival and Identity Sosa, Survival Matters Olson, The Human Animal and An Argument for Animalism Noonan, 'Animalism versus Lockeanism' II. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ETHICAL THEORY Session IV. Reductionism and special concern. Private projects (e.g. that I finish editing this website) are central to our lives and may seem to be ingredients in psychological continuity. Yet they also seem to presuppose personal identity. Are these aspects of private projects consistent? What is the justification of private projects, and how does our answer affect our views about what matters? Perry s claim that special concern is strictly derivative; Whiting s attempt to account for the non-derivative significance of special concern in the framework of psychological reductionism. Required: Perry, The Importance of Being Identical in. Rorty Whiting, Friends and Future Selves Recommended: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp Whiting, Impersonal Friends Broad, Self and Others Brink, Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community Wolf, 'Self Interest and Interest in Selves' Session V. Reductionism and prudence. Parfit offers various arguments against rational egoism or prudence, some of which rest on his reductionist claims about personal identity. Is Parfit right to insist on the parity of interpersonal and intrapersonal distribution? How might the egoist appeal to the separateness of persons to defend her theory? Any defense of egoism that appeals to the separateness of persons must address Parfit s claim that reductionism undermines the separateness of persons. Egoism s temporal neutrality implies that it is rationally required for a person to make a sacrifice now for her own greater future good. Parfit thinks that reductionism challenges the rationality of this kind of sacrifice. One reason he offers is that personal identity is metaphysically less deep, according to the reductionist. He also appeals to the fact that psychological connectedness depreciates over time. Are these arguments compelling? Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters 7, 14 Brink, Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons in. Dancy Recommended: Brink, Self-Love and Altruism Brink, Prudence and Authenticity Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism Johnston, Humean Concerns without Superlative Selves in. Dancy Session VI. Reductionism, responsibility and distributive justice. Parfit also claims that reductionism should affect our attitudes toward moral responsibility and distributive justice. He thinks that reductionism makes it hard for us to hold people responsible for the actions of their earlier selves and to impose long-term punishments for crimes. He also thinks that reductionism undermines the separateness of persons, reduces the importance of distributional principles, and makes utilitarianism more plausible than it would otherwise be. Does reductionism support these moral claims, and are they 3 of 6 11/24/08 9:39 PM

12 Identity and Morality Course file:///users/atany/documents/applications/apa/teaching/per... as revisionary as Parfit thinks? Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapter 15 Jeske, Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism Recommended: Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 5-6 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 33 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp van den Beld, ed. Moral Responsibility and Ontology D. Shoemaker, 'Personal Identity and Practical Concerns' Schultz, 'Persons, Selves and Utilitarianism' Session VII. Reductionism and bioethics. Considerations of personal identity appear in several bioethical discussions. Debates concerning embryonic stem cell research, abortion, or advance directivesare all infused to a great extent with arguments from personal identity. We will only deal with one such field of application: the moral authority of advance directives. Is it morally justified for the will of the non-demented self of the patient to bind his later demented self? Is the demented self the same person? Is he a person at all? Required: Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others, Chapter 3 DeGrazia, 'Advance Directives, Dementia, and 'the Someone Else Problem'' Recommended: Conee, Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion McMahan, The Ethics of Killing Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp Becker, Gerhold K. ed. The Moral Status of Persons Burley, Justine and Harris, John, eds. A Companion to Genetics DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, Chapter 5 Holland, S., Lebacqz K., and Zoloth, L. eds. The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate Olson, Eric T. What Are We?, Chapter 2 Singer, Unsanctifying Human Life BIBLIOGRAPHY Becker, Gerhold K. ed. The Moral Status of Persons: Perspectives on Bioethics, Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000 Brink, David, Self-love and Altruism in. Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): Brink, David, Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons in. Reading Parfit, Dancy ed. pp Brink, David Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community in. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999): Brink, David, Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value in. The Philosophical Review 112 (2003): Broad, C. D. Self and Others in. Broad s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy ed. D. Cheney, London: Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp Buchanan, Allen, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17:4 (Autumn 1988): Buchanan, Allen and Brock, Dan W., Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 Burley, Justine and Harris, John, eds. A Companion to Genetics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002 Butler, Joseph, Of Personal Identity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Conee, Earl, Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion in. Mind 108:432 (Oct, 1999): Dancy, Jonathan (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997 DeGrazia, David, 'Advance Directives, Dementia, and 'the Someone Else Problem'' in. Bioethics 13:5 (1999): DeGrazia, David, Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31:4 (2003): DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 Grice, H. P. Personal Identity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Holland, S., Lebacqz K., and Zoloth, L. eds. The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, MIT Press, 2001 Hume, David, Our Idea of Identity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Hume, David, Of Personal Identity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Hume, David, Second Thoughts in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Jeske, Diane, Persons, Compensation and Utilitarianism in. The Philosophical Review 102 (1993): Johnston, Mark, Humean Concerns Without Superlative Selves in. Reading Parfit, ed. J. Dancy, pp Korsgaard, Christine, 'Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency': A Kantian Response to Parfit' in. Philosophy and Public 4 of 6 11/24/08 9:39 PM

13 Identity and Morality Course file:///users/atany/documents/applications/apa/teaching/per... Affairs, 18:2 (Spring 1989): Lewis, David, Survival and Identity in. The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty ed. pp Locke, John, Of Identity and Diversity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Marquis, Don, Why Abortion Is Immoral in. The Journal of Philosophy, 86:4 (April 1989): McMahan, Jeff, The Ethics of Killing, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002 Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970 Nagel, Thomas, Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 Noonan, H. Personal Identity, Boston: Routledge, 1989 Noonan, H. Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy in. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974 Olson, Eric T. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 Olson, Eric. T. Personal Identity in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Feb. 20, 2007 Olson, Eric T. An Argument for Animalism in. Martin R. and Barresi J. (eds.), Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003 Olson, Eric T. What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Oxford: Oxfird University Press, 2007 Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984 Parfit, Derek, 'Comments' in. Ethics 96:4 (July 1986): Perry, John (ed.), Personal Identity, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975 Perry, John, The Importance of Being Identical in. The Identities of Persons ed. A. Rorty, pp Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971 Reid, Thomas, Of Identity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Reid, Thomas, Of Mr. Locke s Account of Our Personal Identity in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1976 Rovane, Carol, The Bounds of Agency, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998 Schultz, Bert, 'Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism' in. Ethics 96:4 (July 1986): Shoemaker, David, Personal Identity and Ethics in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, March 13, 2007 Shoemaker, David, Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension in. Social Theory and Practice 31 (2005): Shoemaker, David, 'Personal Identity and Practical Concerns' in. Mind 116:462 (April 2007): Shoemaker, Sydney, Persons and Their Pasts in. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): Shoemaker, Sydney, Personal Identity: A Materialist Account in. S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, eds. Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984 Sider, Ted, Four-Dimensionalism, New York: Oxford UP, 2001 Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, 7 th ed. Singer, Peter, Unsanctifying Human Life, ed. Helga Kuhse, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002 Sosa, Ernie, Surviving Matters in. Nous 24 (April 1990): van den Beld, ed. Moral Responsibility and Ontology, the Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Whiting, Jennifer, Friends and Future Selves in. The Philosophical Review 95:4 (1986): Whiting, Jennifer, Impersonal Friends in. The Monist 74 (1991): 3-29 Williams, Bernard, The Self and the Future in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp Wolf, Susan, 'Self Interest and Interest in Selves' in. Ethics 96:4 (July 1986): Wrigley, Anthony, 'Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Directives' in. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24:4 (2007): SCHEDULE Place and time Tuesday D255 Tuesday D255 Friday D255 Topic Introduction, scheduling of presentations, other practical matters Locke and his critics: Locke, Reid, Butler Psychological reductionism and its rivals I: Parfit Presentations (previous semester) Outlines none. Session 0 Tobias on Locke Jon on Butler and Reid Nina on Parfit Chapter 10 Joakim on Parfit Chapter 11 Session 1 Session 2 5 of 6 11/24/08 9:39 PM

14 Identity and Morality Course file:///users/atany/documents/applications/apa/teaching/per... Tuesday D255 Firday D255 Tuesday D239 Friday D255 Tuesday D255 Psychological reductionism and its rivals II: Parfit Lisa on Parfit Chapter 12, 13 Session 3 Reductionism and special concern: Perry, Whiting Karim on Perry Joakim in Whiting Session 4 Reductionism and prudence: Parfit, Brink Jon on Brink Session 5 Reductionism, responsibility, and distributiv justice: Parfit, Jeske Reductionism and bioethics: Buchanan and Brock, DeGrazia Nina on Parfit, Chapter 15 Session 6 Karim on Buchanan and Brock Tobias on DeGrazia Session 7 NEWS 3.3. I have put the course material in a box marked 'Identity' in the expedition office of the Department. Except for the assigned chapter from the Brock and Buchanan book (which I will include later), all articles and chapters are there so that those who don't want to or cannot print can also have access to the assigned readings I have made the changes we have agreed about concerning literature and requirements. We also have a new participant in the course, Joakim. This means that the presentation burden will be reduced to 2 presentations/participant. We will briefly talk about this on Monday The Buchanan and Brock chapter (last session material) is now available for pick up in the expedition office Some of the articles disappeared from the box in the expidition office. I have now replaced them; they are again available for pick up if any of you needs them Please read pp from Parfit's book for Thursday I have fixed the links to the presentation outlines; they now work properly Here are the essay questions for the term paper. Remember: deadlines for submission is 7 APRIL 12AM! New semester I have refreshed the site and uploaded the outline for the introductory session Two rescheduled seminars. Thursday F271 and Monday F Exam: one freely chosen topic or one from the list of questions above. Length etc. are there too. Deadline: Nov. 19. Result by the end of that week. Department of Philosophy Stockholm University 6 of 6 11/24/08 9:39 PM

15 Politikai legitimáció Tanyi Attila A kurzus a legitimáció témakörét normatív szemszögből közelíti meg s célja a politikai legitimáció főbb elméleteinek kritikai vizsgálata. Alapgondolata az, hogy a politikai legitimáció az irányítók és az irányítottak közötti speciális kapcsolatot tételezi fel, amely alapjában határozza meg az egyének társadalomban betöltött erkölcsi státuszát. Mindebből következően az egyének erkölcsi alapú kötelezettségekkel tartoznak államuk felé, amely kötelezettség azonban igazolást igényel. A kurzus célja a filozófiatörténetben fellelhető válaszok tanulmányozása, kritikai vizsgálata (szerződéselmélet, jogi pozitivizmus, integritás, igazságosság stb.): ha ezek közül egyik sem megfelelő, akkor nem marad más hátra mint az anarchista pozíció elfogadása. A kurzus folyamán ezen kérdés megválaszolására fogunk törekedni. 1. téma Bevezetés, a téma behatárolása Kötelező olvasmányok: - David Copp: The Idea of a Legitimate State. In. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1/1999 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - David Beetham: The Legitimation of Power, Houndmills, 1991, pp Richard Flathman: Legitimacy, in. R.Goodin P. Pettit (eds.): A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, A: John Simmons: Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton UP, téma A probléma: a filozófiai anarchizmus koncepiója Kötelező olvasmányok: - Richard Paul Wolff: In Defense of Anarchism, New York, 1976, pp A. John Simmons: Philosophical Anarcism, in. J.T. Sanders J. Narveson (eds.): For and Against the State, Lanham, 1996, pp H. Frankfurt: The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff, in. Political Theory 1 (1973), pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - C. Gans: Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience, Cambridge UP, A. John Simmons: Justification and Legitimacy, in. Ethics, July 1999, pp K. Nielsen: State Authority and Legitimation, in. P. Harris (ed.): On Political Obligation, New York, 1990

16 3. téma Mitől legitim a hatalom? Kötelező olvasmányok: - R.B. Friedman: On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in. Joseph Raz (ed.): Authority, New York, 1990 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Joseph Raz: Introduction, in. Authority, New York, Richard Tuck: Why Is Authority Such a Problem?, in. P.Laslett (ed.): Philosophy, Politics and Society, Oxford, Steven Lukes: Perspectives on Authority, in. Lukes: Moral Conflict and Authority, Ch. 7, Oxford, téma Max Weber legitimáció elmélete Kötelező olvasmányok: - Max Weber: Economy and Society, Berkley, 1978, Part I, Ch.1, pp. 3-38, Ch.3. pp téma Jogi pozitivizmus (Herbert Hart) Kötelező olvasmányok: - H.L.A. Hart: Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in. J. Raz (ed.): Authority, New York, H.L.A. Hart: The Concept of Law, Oxford, 1990, pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Hans Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, in. Harvard Law Review, 55/ N. Bobbio: Sein and Sollen in Legal Science, in. Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie, 6/ N. Luhmann: Essay on Self-Reference, Ch.13, New York, téma Joseph Raz legitimáció koncepciója Kötelező olvasmányok: - Joseph Raz: Authority and Justification, in. Raz (ed.): Authority New York, Joseph Raz: Authority, Law and Morality, in. Monist, 2/1985 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law, Ch. 1, Oxford, Joseph Raz: The Morality of Freedom, Part I, Oxford, téma A társadalmi szerződés Kötelező olvasmányok: - Kim Lane Scheppele Jeremy Waldron: Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal Reasoning, in. Yale Journal of Law and Humanities, 3/ Jean Hampton: Contract and Consent, in. A.Hamlin P. Pettit (eds.): A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, 1993

17 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - L. Green: Consent and Community, in. P. Harris (ed.): On Political Obligation, London, J. Raz: Government by Consent, in. J.R. Pennock J.W. Chapman (eds.): Authority Revisited, Nomos XXIX, New York and London, A. Hamlin: Liberty, Contract and the State, in. A. Hamlin P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Cambridge, Huoranszki Ferenc: Filozófia és utópia, Osiris, 1999, Budapest, pp K. Greenawalt: Promissory Obligation: The Theme of the Social Contract, in. Greenawalt: Conflicts of Law and Morality, New York-Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp téma Legitimáció és igazságosság (John Rawls) Kötelező olvasmányok: - John Rawls: Az igazságosság elmélete, Osiris, Budapest, 1998, 18-19, érvelés - Jeremy Waldron: Special Ties and Natural Duties, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), pp Ajánlott olvasmányok: - John Rawls: Political Liberalism, Columbia UP, 1996, Part II, Lecture 4 - Thomas Nagel: Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16/ Thomas Scanlon: Contractarianism and Utilitarianism, in. A. Sen B. Williams (eds.): Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge UP, 1982, pp C. Bird: Mutual Respect and Neutral Justification, in. Ethics, October Kis János: Az állam semlegessége, in. Kis: Az állam semlegessége, Atlantisz, Budapest, 1997, pp téma Legitimáció és vita (deliberatív demokrácia). Kötelező olvasmányok: - Seyla Benhabib: Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, in. Constellations, 1/ Joshua Cohen: Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in. A. Hamlin P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Oxford, 1991 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Amy Gutmann-Dennis Thompson: The Consitution of Deliberative Democracy, in. Democracy and Disagreement, Belknap, Cambridge, Mass., Joshua Cohen: Democracy and Liberty, in. Jon Elster (ed.): Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge, C.S. Nino : The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, New Haven and London, téma Legitimáció és integritás (Ronald Dworkin) Kötelező olvasmányok: - Rondald Dworkin: Integrity, in. Dworkin: The Law s Empire, Ch. 1, Harvard, 1986

18 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - M. Hardimon: Role Obligations, in. Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994) pp J. Horton: Political Obligation Reconsidered, in. Horton: Political Obligation, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1997, pp téma Közösségelvűség: közös jó koncepció mint legitimáló elv (Charles Taylor) Kötelező olvasmányok: - Charles Taylor: Cross-Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian Debate, in. N.L. Rosenblaum (ed.): Liberalism and the Moral Life, Harvard, Charles Taylor: The Politics of Recognition, in. A. Gutmann (ed.): Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton UP, 1994 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Charles Taylor: The Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard, Will Kymlicka: Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford, Daniel Bell: Communitarianism and its Critics, Oxford, Michael Cooke: Authenticity and Autonomy, in. Political Theory, 2/ téma Politikai semlegesség mint legitimáló elv (Kis János) Kötelező olvasmányok: - Kis János: Natural Duties Regarding Institutions, Kézirat (későbbiekben kiosztandó)

19 !! Dr.$Attila&Tanyi! Professor!in#Moral!Philosophy! Institute(of(Philosophy! GW#II#01.09! T:#+49!921!/"55"4148!(secretariat)! Summer&Semester&2013! Political(Philosophy! "MA!A"2! Description! This%course%offers%a%systematic%introduction%to%contemporary%political%philosophy.%It% comes& in& two& parts.& The& first& part& explores& fundamental& concepts& and& values,& raising' questions' about' the' nature' of' rights,' the' sources' of' political' obligation,' legitimacy! and$ authority$ of$ the$ state,$ the$ significance$ of$ liberty,$ the$ content$ and$ scope& of& distributive& justice,& and& the& justification& of& democracy.& The& second& part& explores( contemporary( challenges( in( normative( political( philosophy,( including( just( war$ and$ the$ legitimate& use& of& force,& global& justice& and& human& rights,& and& climate& change.(!! The$discussion$of$normative$questions$will$originate$from$particular$puzzles$and$real$ questions)in)political)debate,)introduce)historical)writings)where)doing)so)serves)a) systematic" purpose," and" reflect" questions" of" method" all" along" the" way." Students" will$enable$them$to$appreciate$contemporary$contributions$in$leading$journals.! Structure! The$course$consists$of$an#11"lectures"and"corresponding"seminars.! Instructions! 1. Each% seminar% session$ is$ based$ on$ two$ contemporary$ texts$ there$ will$ be$ one$ presentation*for*each*text.! 2. Presentations* should* last* no* longer* than* 15* minutes,* offer* a* concise* and* systematic) overview) of) the) arguments) and) topic) of) your) assigned) reading) and) include(questions(for(discussion.!

20 Gabriel!Wollner!!50013!Responsibility!(SS!2012)!! 2! 3. Seminar(presentations(may(make(use(of(beamer(slides,(but(these(should(be(kept( to#a#minimum#and#be#as#simple#as#possible#(no#special#effects#etc.);#the#idea#is#for# you$to$summarize$your$essay$argument$on"the"slides,"not"reproduce"it.! 4. To#prepare#for$essays$and$exams,$recommendations$for$further$reading$will$be$ available'during'each'lecture.! Assessment! A"seminar"presentation.! A"3000"word"mid"term%essay%and%a%3000%word%end"term%essay.%Your%essays%are%to% be#taken#from#the#list#of#seminar#topics#that#you$have$not!presented.! An#end"term%exam%(2%hours).! The$grade$is$constituted$from$the$best$of$the$essays$(50%)$and$the$exam$(50%).! Deadlines! Mid!term%essay:%Fri$29$June$2012$(by$e"mail).! End!term%essay:"Fri"03!August!2012$(by$e"mail).! End!term%exam:"TBA! Attendance! Attendance(is(compulsory.! Course'Schedule! 1.#Introduction:#The#subject#of#political#Philosophy! Lecture'1:'16'May,'10h 12h! 2.#Authority,#Legitimacy#and#political#obligation! Lecture'2:'23#May,#08h 12h,"S"65"(RW)! Seminar(2:(30(May,(08h 12h,%S65%(RW)! (1)! Simmons,(A.J.((1999),( Justification(and(Legitimacy,(Ethics,"109"(4)," ! (2)! Applbaum,)A.I.)(2010),) Legitimacy)without)the)Duty)to)Obey,)Philosophy)and) Public'Affairs,"38"(3)," ! 3.#Democracy! Lecture'3:'23'May,'10h 12h! Seminar(3:(30(May,!10h 12h! (1)! Christiano,+ Thomas+ (2001),+ Knowledge+ and+ Power+ in+ the+ Justification+ of+ Democracy,+Australasian*Journal*of*Philosophy,"79"(2)," ! (2)! Arneson,( Richard( (2004),( Democracy( Is( Not( Intrinsically( Just,( in( Dowding,( Keith,' Robert.' E.' Goodin," and" Carol" Pateman" (eds.)," Justice( and( Democracy! (Justice)and)Democracy,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press),)40 58.!