3 Austria concerning liquidity reserve obligations in certain banking sectors 3. Commission Recommendation on limitation of auditors'

Átírás

1 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjában (2008.június) kihirdetett jogforrások listája, illetve a pénzügyi szolgáltatások szektorral kapcsolatban az Európai Bizottság honlapján közzétett hírek Tartalomjegyzék: Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja - L (Jogszabályok) Sorszám Cím Oldalszám 1. A Bizottság ajánlása (2008. június 5.) a jog szerinti könyvvizsgálók és könyvvizsgáló cégek polgári jogi felelősségének korlátozásáról (az értesítés a C(2008) számú dokumentummal történt) 2 Sajtóbejelentések Sorszám Cím Oldalszám 1. Insurance: Commission takes action to ensure that five Member 2 States implement EU laws 2. Free movement of capital: Commission closes case against 3 Austria concerning liquidity reserve obligations in certain banking sectors 3. Commission Recommendation on limitation of auditors' 4 liability: Frequently asked questions 4. Auditing: Commission issues Recommendation on limiting 6 audit firms' liability (see MEMO/08/366) 5. Charlie McCREEVY 7 European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Regulating in a Global Market Inaugural Global Financial Services Centre Conference Dublin, 16 June Financial services: Commission encourages applications for 10 new Expert Group on Credit Histories 7. Free movement of capital: Commission requests Slovakia to 11 remove investment restrictions on statutory pension funds 8. Belső piac: a Bizottság fellép annak biztosítása érdekében, hogy 11 hat tagállam végrehajtsa az uniós szabályokat 9. Charlie McCREEVY European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Joint statement by Commissioner Reding and Commissioner McCreevy on the cooperation agreement between the European Payments Council (EPC) and the GSMA on mobile payments Brussels, 30 June

2 Jogszabályok 1. Jogszabály: A Bizottság ajánlása (2008. június 5.) a jog szerinti könyvvizsgálók és könyvvizsgáló cégek polgári jogi felelősségének korlátozásáról (az értesítés a C(2008) számú dokumentummal történt) Megjelent: L 162 (VI.21.) Jogforrás tartalma: Az ajánlás az éves és összevont (konszolidált) éves beszámolók jog szerinti könyvvizsgálatáról, a 78/660/EGK és a 83/349/EGK tanácsi irányelv módosításáról, valamint a 84/253/EGK tanácsi irányelv hatályon kívül helyezéséről szóló, május 17- i 2006/43/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv rendelkezésének megfelelően született. Célja, hogy a tőkepiacok zavartalan működését biztosítsa a fenntartható könyvvizsgálati kapacitás és olyan, jog szerinti könyvvizsgálók és könyvvizsgáló cégek könyvvizsgálói szolgáltatása versenyének támogatása mellett, amelyek képesek és hajlandóak azon vállalkozások jog szerinti könyvvizsgálatát elvégezni, amelyek értékpapírjait valamelyik tagállam szabályozott piacán bevezették. Az ajánlás meghatározza, hogy jog szerinti könyvvizsgálók és könyvvizsgáló cégek szakmai kötelességszegésből származó polgári jogi felelősségének korlátozást a jog szerint könyvvizsgálók vagy könyvvizsgáló cégek által elkövetett szándékos kötelességszegés eseteit kivéve kellene megvalósítani. Ezen túl pedig a felelősség korlátozásának módjaira is javaslatot tesz, kiemelve, hogy a polgári jogi felelősség semmilyen korlátozása nem akadályozhatja meg, hogy a károsult feleket méltányos kártérítésben részesítését. A tagállamoknak az ajánlás alapján hozott intézkedésekről június 5-ig kell tájékoztatni a Bizottságot. Sajtóbejelentések 1. IP/08/870 Brussels, 5 June 2008 Insurance: Commission takes action to ensure that five Member States implement EU laws The European Commission has decided to refer Greece to the European Court of Justice over its failure to implement in national law the Fifth Motor insurance Directive (2005/14/EC) by the agreed date of 11 June The Commission has also decided to formally request Belgium, France, Greece, Latvia and Romania to implement the Directive on reinsurance (2005/68/EC). These formal requests take the 2

3 form of "reasoned opinions", the second stage of the infringement procedure laid down in Article 226 of the EC Treaty. If there is no satisfactory reply within two months, the Commission may refer the matter to the European Court of Justice. Fifth Motor insurance Directive Greece The Directive updates and improves the EU legal framework for Motor Insurance by introducing some new rights for policyholders and by upgrading the protection of traffic accident victims. In the absence of adequate implementation of the Directive, road traffic accident victims as well as policyholders will not be able to benefit from their new rights. Reinsurance Directive Belgium, France, Greece, Latvia and Romania The Directive fills a gap in the EU insurance legislation, which in the past did not regulate specialised re-insurers (i.e. re-insurers which do not conduct direct insurance). The lack of an EU regulatory framework for reinsurance resulted in significant differences in the level of supervision of reinsurance undertakings between different EU Member States and a lack of a level playing field. The regulatory framework of the Directive is based on the existing prudential regime of the non-life Insurance Directives and extends to reinsurance undertakings the system of home state control and the single licence principle. The transposition deadline was 10 December The latest information on infringement proceedings concerning all Member States can be found at: 2. IP/08/871 Brussels, 5 June 2008 Free movement of capital: Commission closes case against Austria concerning liquidity reserve obligations in certain banking sectors The European Commission has closed the infringement procedure initiated against Austria on legislation requiring banks in the cooperative and savings banks sector to keep a liquidity reserve exclusively with their central institution in Austria. Following an amendment made to the Austrian legislation in question, these banks are offered the possibility to keep the liquidity reserve with another bank in the EU if they join a scheme of joint liquidity compensation and keep that reserve to provide liquidity in case of need. The Austrian Banking Act obliged certain credit institutions affiliated to a central institution to hold exclusively with the latter (and according to the terms set by the latter) a liquidity reserve equivalent to a certain percentage of their deposits, and prohibiting the former from placing their liquid resources with other European financial institutions, thus, in the Commission's view, infringing Article 56 (1) EC (IP/04/1244, IP/02/1676). On 1 January 2008 the Austrian Banking Act was amended. After this modification, banks are still required to join a system of joint liquidity compensation and keep a particular liquidity reserve, but this reserve may also be kept with another bank in the EU, provided this bank assumes the obligation to provide liquidity to the local banks in case of need. Under the new law local banks may decide with which institution the liquidity reserve is held. They may entrust, as a group, another bank in Austria or in another Member State with the liquidity tasks in question. The possibility that funds could be withdrawn from the central institutions should incite these institutions to offer appropriate conditions to the local banks. In accordance with its consistent practice, the Commission therefore has decided to close the case as the restriction underlying the infringement procedure has been removed. 3

4 The latest information on infringement proceedings concerning all Member States can be found at: 3. MEMO/08/366 Brussels, 6 June 2008 Commission Recommendation on limitation of auditors' liability: Frequently asked questions Why has the Commission issued the Recommendation? Liability reform is an international issue where Member States should take action. It is in the public interest to ensure sustainable audit capacities and a competitive market for audit firms at international level. In the light of the current audit market structure, liability risks arising from the increasing litigation trend combined with insufficient insurance cover may deter auditors from providing audit services for listed companies. If these structural obstacles (liability risks/lack of insurance) persist, mid-tier audit firms are unlikely to become a major alternative to the "Big 4" audit networks [1] on European capital markets. But there is also a risk of losing some of the existing players. One of the reasons might be that catastrophic claims cause the collapse of one of the major audit networks. More details are given in the related impact assessment. How did the Commission arrive at this conclusion? The debate on auditors' liability limitation was initiated during the discussions on the adoption of the Directive on Statutory Audit. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers agreed that the Commission should examine the problem and issue where appropriate a Recommendation. As a direct follow-up, the Commission mandated London Economics to conduct an independent study [2] on the economic impact of auditors' liability regimes. The study also focused on the insurability of major audit firms. At the same time, the Commission set up a forum of market experts (the Auditors' Liability Forum). The study shows that large claims may put at risk an entire auditing network. This could lead to difficult consequences for the wider economy, such as a significant reduction in statutory audit capacity for large companies, which could possibly create serious problems for companies whose financial statements need to be audited. The study considers the different options for limiting auditors' liability. On the basis of the results of the study, in January 2007, the Commission Services launched a public consultation on the need to reform auditors' liability in Member States and presented four options for a possible initiative. A major concern expressed by stakeholders during this consultation was the lack of choice when selecting an audit firm. This is particularly acute in the market for audit engagements of listed companies. According to the study the "Big 4" account for 85% of audits of listed companies in the EU. In parallel to the public consultation, the Commission also commissioned a further study to examine whether removing the current ownership rules for audit firms [3] could have positive effects allowing more players to enter the international audit market. External capital as well as capital from audit partners could accelerate this process. The study [4] was published in October It highlighted upsides and downsides of such an external capital model. In addition, it emphasised that liability risks for audit firms act as a barrier for mid-tier audit firms entering the market for the audit of listed companies at international level. The impact of liability risk on the cost of capital can be significant and may lead to capital rationing even in the case of audit firms allowed to raise capital externally. Will a liability limitation not have a negative impact on audit quality? Audit quality is fundamental and investors should have full confidence in the auditor. Therefore, the limitation should not apply in case of intentional breach of auditor duties, such as collusive behaviour with management in committing fraud. It should apply only in a case of a negligent behaviour by the auditor. 4

5 During the public consultation in early 2007, a majority of respondents (including investors) from countries where a liability cap already exists (e.g. Germany, Austria or Belgium) supported a Commission initiative and did not believe that their domestic cap had had adverse effects on audit quality. On their side, UK investors also support the possibility to agree proportionate liability by contract provided that the shareholders are asked and give their consent. Therefore, the Commission has not suggested one single method of limitation of auditors' liability (such as a cap) at the EU level. Furthermore, audit regulators - not judges or courts - will in future play a pivotal role in maintaining the high audit quality which companies and investors deserve. In this regard, in addition to the requirements of the recent Directive on Statutory Audit, the Commission adopted on 6 May 2008 a Recommendation strengthening the robustness and independence of inspections of firms auditing listed companies. Such regular inspections provide better guarantees for the quality of the audits compared to unlimited civil liability rules which constrain access to this highly concentrated market. Audit quality should be driven more by sound regular inspections whilst liability should complement such efforts but not make the audit business unattractive. What will be the rights of damaged parties to obtain compensation? In determining the limitation, Member States should take account of injured parties' rights to appropriate compensation. Therefore the damaged parties will have the right to be fairly compensated, under the limits of the method chosen by their Member States. Even without any existing method of limiting liability, the expectations of third parties to obtain compensation face practical limits, corresponding to the financial capacities of the audit firms. In this respect, the advantage of limiting auditors' liability would be that the rules are fixed in advance and hence potential plaintiffs would not expect audit firms to be able to compensate them for unlimited amounts. Why is the scope of the Recommendation so narrow? Why is the limitation applicable only for the audit of listed companies? The Commission recommends that the limitation of liability applies in the case that an auditor or an audit firm performs a statutory audit of a company listed in the EU. It includes statutory audits performed by the group auditor of a company listed in the EU. The scope of the Recommendation arises from Article 31 of the Directive on Statutory Audit, which represents a mandate agreed by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers in However, this Recommendation does not prevent Member States from taking action also in relation to the audits of other limited companies. Experiences in Member States which introduced a cap, such as Germany or Belgium, have shown that liability limitations for the audit of unlisted companies are set at a lower level compared to the audit of listed companies. Member States such as the UK which allow for contractual solutions are not opposed to a cap for the audit of unlisted companies. Should Member States impose a limitation or should they leave the decision to an agreement between companies, shareholders and the auditors? Both options are possible, depending on the legal environment. Before choosing a method of limitation, Member States should examine with the concerned stakeholders the impact on financial markets and investors, the impact on conditions for access to the statutory audit market for listed companies, as well as the impact on audit quality, insurability of risks and the companies to be audited. Why has the Commission not recommended a specific method, such as a cap? The London Economics study already concluded that it is unlikely that a one-size-fits-all EU-wide approach is the most useful. There are considerable variations between civil liability systems in the Member States. In general, respondents to the consultation also considered that the Commission should leave it to Member States to develop their own methods for limiting liability. Therefore, Member States may choose a method of limitation that best suits their legal environment but is in line with the principles of the Recommendation. Three methods which are actually used by Member States (cap, proportionate liability or a contractual limitation) are given as possible examples but any other equivalent method might be used. 5

6 Member States which already have a limitation of liability in place can keep the limitation, but their system might need to be adapted to the principles of the Recommendation, such as application of the limitation to third parties or fair compensation of the damaged parties. Is there not a risk that the Recommendation has positive impacts mainly for the 'Big 4'? The major networks will not receive "immunity" against their audit failure and they will continue to pay compensation to the damaged parties that can still be very high in many cases. A liability limitation should however benefit new market entrants and especially the mid-tier audit firms, as these firms may not have the same ability to establish self-insurance, which was established by the Big 4 more than a decade ago. Furthermore, lower liability risks would provide a stronger incentive for new investment into mid-tier audit firms, which could help them to compete with the major audit networks. If the Recommendation has no practical results, will there be a need for a Directive promoting further harmonisation? The Commission will closely monitor and evaluate the impacts of the Recommendation on the audit market and the way the Recommendation was implemented by Member States, as well as the effects of the implementation. [1] Deloitte, Ernst&Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers [2] London Economics in association with Professor Ralf Ewert, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany: "Study on the Economic Impact of Auditors' Liability Regimes", September 2006 (hereafter, referred to as the London Economics study): [3] Article 3 of the Statutory Audit Directive requires that the majority of the voting rights in audit firms should be held by statutory auditors. [4] Prepared by Oxera 4. IP/08/897 Brussels, 6 June 2008 Auditing: Commission issues Recommendation on limiting audit firms' liability (see MEMO/08/366) The European Commission has issued a Recommendation concerning the limitation of auditors' civil liability. Its main purpose is to encourage the growth of alternative audit firms in a competitive market. The Recommendation responds to the increasing trend of litigation and lack of sufficient insurance cover in this sector. It aims to protect European capital markets by ensuring that audit firms remain available to carry out audits on companies listed in the EU. The Recommendation leaves it to Member States to decide on the appropriate method for limiting liability, and introduces a set of key principles to ensure that any limitation is fair for auditors, the audited companies, investors and other stakeholders. This initiative arises from a mandate in the 2006 Directive on Statutory Audit to examine the issue of limitation of financial liability and to present recommendations to Member States where appropriate. Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said: After in-depth research and extensive consultation, we have concluded that unlimited liability combined with insufficient insurance cover is no longer tenable. It is a potentially huge problem for our capital markets and for auditors working on an international scale. The current conditions are not only preventing the entry of new players in the international audit market, but are also threatening existing firms. In a context of high concentration and limited choice of audit firms, this situation could lead to damaging consequences for European capital markets. 6

7 The Recommendation proposes three examples as possible methods but any other equivalent method might be used. The selected method should best suit the Member State's legal environment. The Recommendation also introduces key principles to be followed by Member States when they select a limitation method: The limitation of liability should not apply in the case of intentional misconduct on the part of the auditor; A limitation would be inefficient if it does not also cover third parties; Damaged parties have the right to be fairly compensated. The Recommendation is available at: 5. SPEECH/08/334 Charlie McCREEVY European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Regulating in a Global Market Inaugural Global Financial Services Centre Conference Dublin, 16 June 2008 Good morning Ladies & Gentlemen, The financial services sector in Europe is both a significant sector in its own right, and vital in providing capital and investment across a single EU market. In recent years the growth in the sector was nearly twice that of EU GDP- and double the levels of the late 90s. This is a significant change and illustrates the recent expansion of this sector in Europe. In today's global markets, regulation can no longer be considered 'domestic'. International standards and financial globalisation have dramatically changed the landscape, both for the financial services sector and for its regulators. Today I would like to focus on the European Commission's approach to regulation and how we have gone about opening our markets and ensuring, as far as possible, the global competitiveness and attractiveness of Europe as a leading global financial centre. Integrated, global financial markets The recent financial turmoil has clearly shown just how integrated financial services markets have become. A collapse in the US sub-prime mortgage market sparked a global breakdown in both investor and financial sector confidence. Here in Europe it did not take long before we saw first hand these effects - with the near failure of a bank in Germany, and the first run on a UK bank in over a century. We are still to see a full evaluation of the impact that this turmoil has had, both on Europe and the world, but expect it to be significant. EU policy approach getting the legislative framework 'right' 7

8 Our job as regulators is to make sure that the legislative framework is right and to own up when it is not. The quality of regulation is tested in bad not in good times. Our regulatory system needs to be designed to cope with difficult situations. The difficulty lies in creating the right balance between creating a framework which is flexible enough to allow entrepreneurs and innovation to flourish, but which also creates an environment where both investors and consumers have confidence in the market. The recent turmoil has vividly illustrated the significant impact that a loss of investor confidence can have on the financial services market. I believe that good regulation, and by definition, a globally competitive regulatory environment, is based on three key factors. Firstly, that there are fewer, and where they do exist, better targeted rules. Second, that we have clear but not inflexible procedures that are followed before rules are adopted. These include open consultation, economic impact analysis, early participation of market professionals and national regulators. But let me make one thing clear: Regulators must not be captured by market participants and economic impact analysis is no substitute for commercial common sense or a proper understanding of the structures and cultures that drive bad behaviour whether in mortgage brokers, banks, or credit rating agencies. And third, that there is effective enforcement. The foundation for the EU's common financial services market was laid in 1999 with the adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan. The objective was to create an integrated, Europe-wide, single market in financial services through a framework of legislation, co-operation and practice. We foresaw significant benefits that could come from this approach - from stimulating pan-european competition and innovation, reducing the cost of capital for industry, strengthening financial stability and providing a regulatory environment that would attract further investment. Nine years on we have seen a transformation of the financial services landscape across Europe. The Lamfalussy process has served us reasonably well in the policy making process and has provided a basis for greater supervisory convergence and cooperation but the processes must also continue to be refined to ensure that the Lamfalussy process and the level 3 committees are best placed to add value in the policy making process. The response to the credit crisis Last October, Europe's Finance Ministers agreed on a 'roadmap' as a first response to the many weaknesses that the turmoil had identified in the financial system. The roadmap had four key objectives, to improve transparency in the market, to improve valuation standards especially for illiquid assets, to strengthen the EU's prudential framework for the banking sector, to investigate structural issues, and to examine the role of credit ratings agencies. On some of these issues work is well advanced. Endless procrastination is not my style and where good progress- involving supervisors, regulators and market experts - has been made in deliberating on potential solutions I intend to move forward purposefully rather than allow clever lobbyists manipulate or slow things down in the interests of their clients. I said before that I would not wait indefinitely for the credit rating agencies to come forward with meaningful proposals to put their houses in order. And I mean what I say. The IOSCO Code of Conduct to which the rating agencies signed up has been shown to be a toothless wonder. The fact is that despite the checks on compliance with the IOSCO Code, no supervisor appears to have got as much as a sniff of the rot at the heart of the structured finance rating process before it all blew up. I am deeply sceptical that the appropriate response lies in building on and strengthening the IOSCO code: While external oversight of rating agencies is important it is not sufficient to adequately address the issues. Many of the recent IOSCO task force recommendations do not appear enforceable in a meaningful way and I am now convinced that limited but mandatory, well targeted and robust internal governance reforms are going to be imperative to complement stronger external oversight of rating agencies. 8

9 While some of the additional steps that the main rating agencies have announced are welcome, they are insufficient. I know some would be willing to do more but I can quite understand why they are reluctant to move forward with more ambitious proposals if there isn't going to be a level playing field. This is one of many reasons why I have concluded that a regulatory solution at European level is now necessary to deal with some of the core issues. I want to thank both CESR and ESME for their valuable work even if I do not agree with ALL of their conclusions.. I welcome the focus on analytics and policy and also on the importance of corporate culture, and on corporate governance of the rating agencies as stressed by ESME. It is absolutely essential to ensure that there are sufficiently strong and robust firewalls between those who, on the one hand, are charged with the primary responsibility to shareholders of driving forward earnings and those who on the other hand must have the primary responsibility for managing the quality and integrity of the rating process. Remuneration and incentive packages for analysts must also be geared to underpinning long term confidence in the ratings they disseminate. ESME correctly identify the management challenge of promulgating the appropriate organizational culture to effectively manage the conflicts of interest arising from the trade off between quality standards and profitability, especially in structured finance because of the exceptional and disproportionate impact on earnings of the flow of new structured finance ratings issued. Their recommendations on corporate culture are ones I fully endorse. However ESME's argument that regulation of the rating agencies could be seen as some sort of official endorsement of the ratings they disseminate is not a view I share because the rating agencies have already been given recognition, legitimacy, and implicit trust in key pieces of European financial services regulation that is designed to underpin financial stability and investor protection including UCITS and the CRD. Indeed it is appropriate that we ask ourselves if in circumstances where so many of the rating agencies have standards of governance that fall so far short of best practice : Is it right that their ratings should be so embedded and implicitly "endorsed" in these pieces of legislation without best practice in corporate governance? That is an issue that merits focus in the final stages of the CRD review, as well as in Solvency 2 and in the UCITS "eligible assets" regime. I recognise that the views of our Member State governments on various aspects of corporate governance diverge. For that reason I will not be proposing a template for rating agency governance that would create or could be seen as a precedent for other businesses that do not play such a central role in our financial market regulatory system or have such embedded conflicts of interest in their business models. Having considered the reports from CESR, from ESME, and indeed the work of the IOSCO task force, and having consulted with the rating agencies themselves I am convinced that meaningful but targeted regulatory measures are now necessary for rating agencies operating in the structured credit markets in Europe, including registration, external oversight and much better internal governance. Let me be clear: External oversight is absolutely necessary in respect of, for example, the policies and procedures of CRAs. But on the substance of ratings and design of models it would be inappropriate. Regulators should not be in the business of opining on individual rating content. However robust, ringfenced internal governance of rating content, including statistical modelling and of the quality and remuneration structures of analysts and the promulgation of appropriate corporate culture, is absolutely essential. We have now started work on the issues involved and I want to propose appropriate measures to the College in coming months. I hope we can also craft these measures in a way that will encourage entry to the market by new players, working perhaps on a different business model. We will continue to listen to stakeholders but we will not be diverted by delaying tactics. Europe must and will take a lead in addressing the challenges and risks presented. Integration and globalisation in financial markets means that much regulation can no longer be evaluated at a purely 'local' level. Regulators must consider global as well as local risks, international developments in financial innovation, as well as the increasing complexity of multinationals and crossborder service providers. It is with this in mind that the EU has set up regulatory dialogues on financial services. Primarily with the US, but also with Japan, China, Russia and India. Naturally, our dialogue with the US is the most developed and I am sure that Paul (Atkins) will confirm that it works well and that it works at every level. In our discussions with the U.S. we have agreed on a number of current and critical issues including accounting, banking, securities and many other issues. One of our key objectives has been to promote international standards. Carefully crafted, they are a powerful tool to extract the best from globalisation. Late last year, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox announced the ending of reconciliation from IFRS to US GAAP. This decision will not only greatly benefit EU companies with a US listing but is a major step forward for global convergence of accounting standards. Just as importantly, this decision has taken less than two years to come into 9

10 being after the SEC and the European Commission affirmed their commitment to a roadmap to do away with costly reconciliations between US and EU accounting standards. Importantly, during the recent turmoil we have been in close contact with the US and you will note that there is broad consensus between the EU and the US on many of the policy responses to the turmoil. Of course while there will often be consensus on ends there will not always be consensus on means. That however does not mean, in the case of rating agencies for example, that we shouldn't - over the longer term see whether there could be some further convergence of approach. In the meantime however Europe cannot fail to address the issues in the way we consider necessary to protect the interests of our investors and as part of the enhanced architecture for underpinning the stability of our financial institutions. In all of our dialogues, we are pragmatic. We want to solve problems and not get bogged down in establishing more bureaucracy or complex procedures but to address regulatory issues which are creating real business problems. This approach is consistent with the 'light touch', principles based regulatory approach I outlined earlier. But when I say 'light touch' I in no way mean 'soft touch'. I firmly believe in international competition and open markets. To this end I have always been very firm with Member States and national regulators when protectionist tendencies spring up. It is the same for third countries. Conclusion I believe that we have come a long way towards creating an environment in Europe that fosters growth and innovation in financial services. But there is still more to be done and we, and by that I mean, all regulators, must make sure that the regulatory environment remains flexible and current to the needs of the global financial sector. If we can achieve this aim we will ensure the success of all financial centres, not only in Europe, but throughout the world. Thank you for your attention. 6. IP/08/944 Brussels, 16 June 2008 Financial services: Commission encourages applications for new Expert Group on Credit Histories The European Commission is to create an Expert Group on Credit Histories (EGCH). The group will be composed of experts competent in the area of credit data. It will aim to identify solutions that maximize the circulation of credit data within the EU, and will present its recommendations in the form of a report to be completed by 1 May Interested candidates are invited to send an application to the Commission by 14 July Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said: "Access to and availability of credit data are important factors in a competitive banking market. They reduce the advantage of large market players who have access to a wide range of information on their clients and make it easier for foreign players to enter the market. The possibility for financial institutions to have access to complete and correct credit data on their clients also has an important impact on consumers' welfare. Insufficient information limits product choice and may lead to unnecessarily high prices for the consumer." The call for applications will be open until 14 July It is addressed to experts representing both private and public stakeholders: consumer associations, the financial industry, national authorities, academia, etc., who demonstrate the relevant competences and practical experience. A maximum of 20 experts will be selected. The creation of the EGCH is one of the Commission initiatives announced in its Communication on 'A Single Market for 21 st century Europe' published in November 2007 (IP/07/1728). The mandate of the experts will start with the first meeting of the group, in September 2008, and end with the completion of their report. The group will meet in Brussels and will be chaired by the Internal Market and Services DG of the European Commission. 10

11 More detailed information about the mandate of the group and the selection criteria for the members can be found in the documentation available at: 7. IP/08/1034 Brussels, 26 June 2008 Free movement of capital: Commission requests Slovakia to remove investment restrictions on statutory pension funds The European Commission has decided to formally request Slovakia to remove its investment restrictions on statutory pension funds, which in the Commission's view constitute an infringement of Article 56 Treaty EC prohibiting restrictions on free movement of capital. This formal request takes the form of a "reasoned opinion", the second stage of the infringement procedure laid down in Article 226 of the EC Treaty. If there is no satisfactory reply within two months, the Commission may refer the matter to the European Court of Justice. In the Commission's view, Article 82 of the Act no. 43/2004 (as amended) on retirement pension savings constitutes a restriction on free movement of capital between Member States, as it establishes a quantitative limit on investments. By virtue of this provision, fund managers cannot invest 30% of their assets in other Member States. Moreover, fund managers are hindered from investing more than 20% in securities issued or guaranteed by another Member State, while this limit would not apply with regard to securities issued or guaranteed by the Slovak Republic. These conditions are hindering capital movements between Member States as they render investment abroad impossible or less attractive than domestic investment. The explanation provided by the Slovak authorities, that those restrictions take into account society's interest in the creation of an economic and financial stimulus which would promote the development of the Slovak capital market, is not legitimate in the Commission's opinion. The aim of promoting the development of the domestic capital market does not constitute an overriding requirement of general interest, in the meaning of Article 58 (1) EC, that would justify restrictions on investments. It is settled case-law that economic grounds can never serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty. The latest information on infringement proceedings concerning all Member States can be found at: 8. IP/08/1036 Brüsszel, június 26. Belső piac: a Bizottság fellép annak biztosítása érdekében, hogy hat tagállam végrehajtsa az uniós szabályokat A Bizottság lépéseket tesz annak biztosítása érdekében, hogy hat tagállam végrehajtsa a belső piaccal kapcsolatos uniós szabályokat. A Bizottság eljárást indít Lettország ellen az Európai Bíróság előtt, mivel az elmulasztotta egy társasági joggal kapcsolatos irányelvnek a nemzeti jogrendszerében való végrehajtását. Magyarország ellen is bírósági eljárás indul az egyik tőkekövetelmény-irányelv végrehajtásának elmulasztása miatt. Végül a Bizottság hivatalos felszólításokat küld a Cseh Köztársaság, Hollandia, Lengyelország és Portugália részére a viszontbiztosításról szóló irányelv végrehajtásának elmulasztása miatt. Ezek a felszólítások indokolással ellátott vélemény formáját öltik, amely az EK-Szerződés 226. cikkében előírt jogsértési eljárás második lépését jelenti. Ha a Bizottság két hónapon belül nem kap kielégítő választ, az ügyet az Európai Bíróság elé utalhatja. 11

12 Társasági jog Lettország A meghatározott jogi formájú társaságokra vonatkozó nyilvánossági követelményeket megállapító irányelv (a 2003/58/EK irányelv) az első társasági jogi irányelvet (a 68/151/EGK irányelvet) korszerűsítette azáltal, hogy lehetővé tette, hogy a társaságok elektronikus úton nyújtsanak be dokumentumokat a cég- vagy kereskedelmi nyilvántartásokba. Az irányelv azt is lehetővé tette, hogy az érdekelt felek a dokumentumok másolatait elektronikus úton kérjék ki a nyilvántartásból. A tagállamoknak december 31-ig kellett végrehajtaniuk az irányelv rendelkezéseit. A Bizottság úgy döntött, hogy az említett irányelv végrehajtásának elmulasztása miatt jogsértési eljárást indít Lettország ellen az Európai Bíróság előtt. Tőkekövetelmény-irányelvek Magyarország A Bizottság úgy döntött, hogy eljárást indít a Bíróság előtt Magyarország ellen, mivel az elmulasztotta az egyik tőkekövetelmény-irányelv (a befektetési vállalkozások és hitelintézetek tőkemegfeleléséről szóló 2006/49/EK irányelv) átültetését. Noha Magyarország megtette az átültetéshez szükséges főbb lépéseket, az általa hozott végrehajtási intézkedések tekintetében továbbra is hiányosságok tapasztalhatók. A 2006/49/EK irányelv esetében a Bizottságnak megküldött értesítés csupán részleges átültetésre utal. A tőkekövetelmény-irányelveket a tagállamoknak december 31-ig kellett nemzeti jogrendjükbe átültetniük. Az irányelvek új szabályokat állapítottak meg a tőkekövetelmények vonatkozásában. A tőkekövetelmények előírják, milyen összegű pénzforrásokkal kell a bankoknak és befektetési vállalkozásoknak rendelkezniük annak érdekében, hogy képesek legyenek fedezni az általuk viselt kockázatokat, és biztosítani tudják a betétesek védelmét. A fent említett két irányelv gondoskodik arról, hogy a tagországok Európa-szerte következetesen alkalmazzák a tőkekövetelmények vonatkozásában meghatározott új keretrendszert, amelyet a Bázeli Bankfelügyeleti Bizottság fogadott el ( Bázel II egyezmény). Viszontbiztosítás Cseh Köztársaság, Hollandia és Portugália A viszontbiztosításról szóló 2005/68/EK irányelv hiányt pótol a biztosításokra vonatkozó uniós jogalkotásban, amely a múltban nem szabályozta a szakosodott viszontbiztosítók (azaz közvetlen biztosítási tevékenységgel nem foglalkozó viszontbiztosítók) működését. A viszontbiztosításra vonatkozó uniós szabályozási keret hiánya miatt a különböző tagállamokban működő, viszontbiztosítással foglalkozó vállalkozások felügyeleti szintje között jelentős eltérések tapasztalhatók, és nem biztosítottak az egyenlő versenyfeltételek. Az irányelv szabályozási kerete az életbiztosítás körén kívül eső biztosításokról szóló irányelvek meglévő prudenciális rendszerére épül, és a viszontbiztosítással foglalkozó vállalkozásokra is kiterjeszti a székhely szerinti állam által végzett ellenőrzés és az egységes engedély elvét. Az átültetésre meghatározott határidő december 10-én járt le. Tekintettel arra, hogy a tagállamok nem tettek meg minden intézkedést az irányelv átültetése érdekében, ezzel veszélyeztetik az irányelvvel bevezetett szabályok érvényesülését. A Bizottság hivatalos felszólítást küldött az említett tagállamoknak, és mivel az irányelv teljes körű átültetésére és a vonatkozó átültető intézkedések közlésére ezután sem került sor, a mulasztó tagállamok esetében indokolással ellátott vélemény elküldéséről határozott. A tagállamokat érintő jogsértési eljárásokkal kapcsolatos legújabb információk a következő internetcímen találhatók: 12

13 9. SPEECH/08/365 Charlie McCREEVY European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Joint statement by Commissioner Reding and Commissioner McCreevy on the cooperation agreement between the European Payments Council (EPC) and the GSMA on mobile payments Brussels, 30 June 2008 EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Charlie McCreevy, and EU Telecoms Commissioner Viviane Reding welcomed the announcement today of GSMA, the global trade body for the mobile industry, and European Payments Council (EPC) to promote the use of mobile payment services. EPC and GSMA have agreed today to accelerate the deployment of services that enable consumers to pay for goods and services in shops, restaurants and other locations using their mobile phones. Bringing more competition to the payment services market has been my aim and agreements such as this show the possibilities that new technologies and innovative approaches offer in this regard said Mr. McCreevy. "This is exactly what the Payment Services Directive, which comes into force at end of 2009, is designed to promote", he added. "Voluntary industry agreements by the mobile industry are always welcome where they bring about concrete benefits of consumers and enhance the level-playing field for European companies in due respect of competition rules", said Commissioner Reding. "I therefore applaud today's announcement which should bring Europe to the forefront of mobile payments." Mr. McCreevy recalled that a huge effort is being made by industry and stakeholders to create the conditions for a Single Euro Payments Area. In this regard he said that standards and requirements resulting from the agreement should be prepared in an open and transparent manner. "It is important that all stakeholders can have access to the process so that the outcome is of benefit to all." he said. Background SEPA - The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is an initiative of the European banking industry that will make all electronic payments across the euro area e.g. by credit card, debit card, bank transfer or direct debit as easy as domestic payments within one country are now. Banks have been able to make the first SEPA products available since 1 January 2008, and are aiming to make SEPA a reality for everyone by the end of EPC - The European Payments Council (EPC) is the trade association representing the European banking industry on payments and is responsible for defining the rules and standards for creating the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). EPC represents 8000 banks in 31 countries (EU, EEA and Switzerland). GSMA - The GSM Association (GSMA) is the global trade association representing more than 750 GSM mobile phone operators across 218 countries and territories of the world. The Association's members represent more than 3 billion GSM and 3GSM connections - over 86% of the world's mobile phone connections. A sajtóbejentések elérhetőek: rname=prof&advanced=0&guilanguage=en 13